Blog PostsFriends | BlogReview of Ch. 5-6 of Herbert Marcuse's "One Dimensional Man"In chapters 5-6 of his book, Marcuse openly dialogues on the effect oftechnological rationality on society. Marcuse asserts that scientific rationality, the parent of technological rationality, has occupied an ideological role within society, one which serves to uphold the dominant interests. This is visible on many levels. He notes that what is called ‘rationality’ within society is actually irrational. It is the hi-jz%@x*& of scientific method by vested interests, who intend to use science and technology as a means of upholding a system of power which subjects the vast majority of the earth’s inhabitants to complete and utter servitude. In capitalist society, this means that technological rationality has been used as a means of upholding the power of the bourgeois class over that of the proletariat. Marcuse notes that the more philosophical-centered notion of the dialectic was rejected on these very grounds in favor of an all-encompassing mode of scientific analysis and quantifiability. “[The philosopher] subjects experience to his critical judgment, and this contains a value judgment – namely, that freedom from toil is preferable to toil, and an intelligent life is preferable to a stupid life. It so happened that philosophy was born with these values. Scientific thought had to break this union of value judgment and analysis, for it became increasingly clear that the philosophic values did not guide the organization of society nor the transformation of nature.” (126) It was also partly rejected on the grounds that it did not accurately reflect the real conditions of life, that philosophy was dissociated from the given material conditions of reality and therefore divorced from the basis of effective action. In this vein of discourse, logic, the source of scientific thought, had its origins in humankind’s need to create what Marcuse calls ” theoretical harmony out of actual discord, to purge thought from contradictions, to hypostatize identifiable and fungible units in the complex process of society and nature.” (137) Because the process itself is based on the domination and control of nature, Marcuse argues that it is out of line with the foundations of a peaceful society. He points out that control over nature quickly leads to control over man, and that the signs and symbols of the scientific-rational mode of thought have simply become a means of quantifying nature into malleable units towards an end which remains as-yet undefined. He notes that the dissociation of scientific rationality from the ethics and values inherent in philosophical thought makes it clear that science itself serves as a value-system, or ideological worldview, which serves to uphold a set of relations which are inherently oppressive to the working class. The ideological structure of scientific rationality claims that the processes which result in the quantification of nature and human beings into resources and labour-power, respectively, represent the means toward the end of continuous improvement in the standard of living of all people, and therefore represents the sociological myth of progress. In reality it is simply a process which makes the domination of some groups of individuals by others more tolerable by improving the standard of living of most, while enslaving them to the very system which creates so many wonderful, useful “things”. Continuous technological advancement ensures that individuals are more closely bound to the imperatives of the system itself. Technology also enhances the repressive function of society. Or, as Marcuse puts it, “In this universe, technology also provides the great rationalization of the unfreedom of man and demonstrates the ‘technical’ impossibility of being autonomous, of determining one’s own life. For this unfreedom appears neither as irrational nor political, but rather as submission to the technical apparatus which enlarges the comforts of life and increases the productivity of labor. Technological rationality thus protects rather than cancels the legitimacy of domination, and the instrumentalist horizon of reason opens on a rationally totalitarian society.” (159) I essentially agree entirely with Marcuse’s analysis. Marcuse describes science’s obsession with “objective” reality as the great negation of Plato’s understanding of finite being as the ‘incomplete manifestation’ of ideal conditions, and subject to change; the subjective qualities of the idealistic vision are merely the unmanifested qualities of an existing potentiality which has yet to be realized. I agree essentially with this idea, and I believe that the ideological basis of scientific rationalism has a tendency to limit the discourse on possible utopic alternatives, which may in fact be possible to achieve through an understanding that a qualitative change in human relations is possible. Will capitalism be the final historical stage of antagonistic social relations?Ever since the beginning of history, the master-slave relationship has perpetuated itself in various forms of social production. The earliest civilizations were civilizations based on the use of slave labour, and the social mode of production was organized in a hierarchical fashion with slaves at the bottom, and kings, emperors and other royal figures occupying the highest tiers. These relationships, needless to say, were relations of domination, the domination of one group of individuals over another. The systemic reality was that the vast majority of the civilized world were subjected to the ruling class. The basic configuration of society hasn't changed much in it's structural reality. A ruling class still exists, despite all proclamations to the contrary. The relations of production turned a major page during the industrial revolution, which saw the rise of a bourgeois class of capitalists. These capitalists replaced the ruling nobility of the earlier period as the dominant class, and of course they now had a basic level of control over the levers of government, which made them the dominant class. Now, people were free to move from job to job, but because of the nature of the system, the vest majority of people were forced to sell their land to the capitalist enterprises, who were growing in size and power. Small producers could not compete, and of course this spelled the end for independent producers, such as artisans. Today we see that larger corparations are also replacing the smaller ones, and large corporate conglomerates are the rule of the day. Anyhow, the worker was still forced to take part in the mode of production, but instead of being able to produce and sell his own products on the market, the growing technology involved in commodity production ensured that only the extremely wealthy would be able to seriously compete in most areas of global production. When the New World was discovered, this pattern was disrupted, as there was a shortage of workers, and plentiful natural resources. This meant that workers in the new world, because of it's small population and natural abundance, were well-compensated for their work. Small producers were once again able to find themselves in a climate that favoured competition. But once again the true rules of capitalism asserted themselves, and an oligopoly began to form among the world's largest producers, who continued to consume the smaller ones. Today, Corporations have considerable leverage over the world's governments, to a point where many speculate that the line between government and "big business" has been considerably blurred. The conditions for small businesses continue to deteriorate, and most small to medium-sized industries are now in serious peril, and have been for some time. What this has meant for the average worker is that he is forced to sell his labour to the capitalist in order to meet his needs, but most importantly, the considerable diminishment of global competition has intensified the power which capitalists now hold over the average worker. The globalization of production (a situation in which corporations can now threaten non-compliant governments, who say, want to raise the taxes for corporations in an effort to increase social spending, or minimum wage for workers, into following their dictates) means that governments who do not follow the dictates of these companies will likely find them moving to an area that has a more easily exploitable labour force. This situation has literally precipitated the recent economic meltdown, which has been long in the making, although it was delayed by the availability of cheap, easy credit, which kept the economy afloat. Anyhow, you can see how this sort of situation could easily snowball into a situation in which the global workforce is completely at the mercy of a greedy corporate oligarchy. Now I believe that any system based on exploitation is doomed for failure (mark my words), however, I wonder whether the end of capitalism will precipitate a new system which will have all the fundamental features of a free, even 'utopic' society, or whether the master-slave relationship will continue to be a dominant feature of human social relations, a reality rooted in the vastly differing interests of individuals and groups within society. What do you think? I look forward to your opinions.How I would spend $10,000New Clothes, an apartment, and healthy food. That's what I'd spend it onLife is but a DreamLife is but a DreamBy CanadianTheorist Life is a strange phenomenon That I can’t explain without resorting to mathematical formulas Which won’t do justice to the mystery of it all. Life is a metaphor. Without the use of poetry, how could I describe The vast, sprawling, expanding, organic thing That is life? I would rather say that as I read this, Life is A combination of disparate elements That are united by the mind, By the imagination. The nightmare of a dark night, An endless despair, How quickly it turns into tomorrow’s bright sunshine. The sound of birds will quickly replace the sound Of the wounded, the crippled, the maimed, the insane. Oh, how strange this life is. How utterly wonderful and fantastic. Even as I read this aloud, in my mind, I can picture the warm sunshine Upon my face. How then, could I ever despair Knowing that I am part of an adventure, a puzzle, a beauty beyond measure, Feeling the inspiration of the divine deep within my breast, And enjoying the ride of a lifetime? Another Essay - I love to post these - The Liberal State in Hobbes and LockeThe Liberal State and in Hobbes and LockeBy CanadianTheorist Private property is a core component of the theoretical foundation of capitalism. The role of the state in protecting property rights within liberal market societies are clearly described in the political writings of John Locke and Thomas Hobbes. The works of both theorists have long been used as a justification for the liberal- democratic state. According to this view, the need for civil society arises out of the need to protect private property from the competitive interests of individuals in the chaotic state of nature. Through the imposition and enforcement of civil law, they believed that self-preservation could be better protected than in the state of nature. This is because without government, men would necessarily be insecure about their possessions, and would be in a state of incessant conflict with each other for survival. Thomas Hobbes, in Leviathan, provides a more elaborate description of men in the state of nature as engaged in the incessant pursuit of power over others. However, the postulates which Hobbes and Locke both call to point regarding man in the state of nature, particularly the normative assumptions about man’s necessary struggle for power, are drawn from a set of socially acquired characteristics in man. These socially acquired traits are found only in men who belong topossessive market societies. The understanding of Hobbes’s natural man as possessing historically rooted and socially acquired characteristics opens up a new understanding of the theories of both Locke and Hobbes regarding men in civil society. Both theories are intrinsically rooted in historical circumstances, and therefore the conclusions which both arrive at regarding not only the state of mankind, but the nature of civil society, must be understood only in the context of possessive market societies. Both are meant to provide a framework for the orderly functioning of a possessive market society. The theories of both Hobbes and Locke may be properly understood as providing the framework for responsible government in liberal market societies. The basis of what constitutes civil society, for Locke, is to establish and enforce laws which ensure the continued functioning of the market. Locke states unequivocally that men establish laws and a coercive authority for one end chiefly, which is ��the preservation of their property” (352). What a man may call his property, according to Locke, is “whatsoever … he removes out of the state that Nature hath provided, and left it in, (which) he hath mixed his Labour with, and (thereby) joined to it something that is his own” (288). Therefore, Locke concludes that what meets the condition of a man’s property is simply that which is the product of his labour. In this sense, Locke is also pointing out, as Hobbes does also, that a man’s labour is an alienable commodity. Hobbes also points this out in chapter 24 of Leviathan when he says that “…a man’s labour (is also) a commodity exchangeable for benefit, as well as any other thing” (164). Because property is seen as a product of labour power, there also must necessarily be a market in men’s labour. In The Political Theory of Possessive Iindividualism, C. B. Macpherson points out that the alienation of labour is required in order to sustain this particular type of market economy, because “without it, one of the essential features of modern competitive market societies (i.e. the labour market) would be impossible”. The understanding of property as an alienable commodity ensures that it may be accumulated. Macpherson notes that “unless land and resources can be transferred through a market, and so be combined with labour in the most profitable way, full advantage cannot be taken of the availability of labour.” (“Political”, 60). By establishing this particular relationship between labour and the market, competition is laid out as the necessary model for social relations between individuals in the possessive market society, ensuring a system whereby property may be accumulated and maintained. The accumulation of property in the possessive market society can only take place if land, resources and labour are alienable commodities that can be traded in the market. The accumulation of property allows for a net transfer of some men’s powers to others. Macpherson points out that this transfer takes place because most men have lost “free access to the means of turning their capacity to labour into productive labour” (“Political, 57). In The Real World of Democracy, Macpherson points out that because most people do not have enough land or capital they must work on someone else’s. This is because the “accumulated capital, and the effective power to accumulate it” has become concentrated “in the hands of a relatively small number of persons” (42). Because the vast majority of people have lost the basic right of access to the means of production, most men “must continually sell the remainder of their powers to those who have the land and capital, and must accept a wage which allows part of the product to go to the owners of land and capital” (57). In so doing, property rights uphold the dominant ethos of individual competition which is woven deeply into the fabric of capitalist society. The transfer between classes is maintained by continual competition at all levels of society. “Everyone is a possessor of something, if only his capacity to labour; all are drawn into the market; competition determines what they will get for what they have to offer” (“Political”, 57). Karl Marx was among the first intellectuals to acknowledge that this net transfer of power was inherently oppressive to an entire class of labourers in capitalist society. For Marx, Private property, and the class antagonisms produced by the possessive market economy, resulted in “new conditions of oppression, new forms of struggle in place of the old ones” (“Communist”, 4). Marx pointed out that historically, these struggles have resulted “either in a revolut- ionary reconstitution of society at large, or in the common ruin of the contending classes” (3). The notion of class struggle, which is based on Marx’s writings, originated as a critique of the system of net transfer which is upheld by the liberal state. In order to contain class struggle within acceptable limits, and therefore maintain existing power relations, a coercive power is needed. The possessive market society, which is based on a net transfer of power, must ensure the use of coercion through the state in order to maintain the dominance of the capitalist ruling class. Insofar as states exist to maintain this power arrangement, they also contribute to class antagonism, a type of social disorder, which would not be possible without the existence of a liberal Government. By examining the role of the state as put forth by Hobbes and Locke, it becomes clear that the liberal state exists to maintain a certain type of order which is required for the continuance of the net transfer. The need for the state is commonly justified through a view of human nature which is found in the theories of both Hobbes and Locke, both of which see men in their natural state as necessarily involved in the incessant pursuit of power. According to Hobbes, mankind is characterized by a “perpetual and restless desire of power after power, that ceaseth only in death”. Despite Hobbes’s analysis of human nature, it is clear that man’s endless appetite for power is a socially acquired characteristic, not a natural one. Hobbes notes that the reason for man’s ceaseless appetite for power is “because he cannot assure the power and means to live well, which he hath present, without the acquisition of more” (66). According to Macpherson, this can only be the case in a society in which men’s social relations are necessarily competitive. Macpherson postulates that the natural man which Hobbes describes is not uncivilized man in the state of nature, but “is a deduction from the appetites and other faculties not of man as such but of civilized men” (“Political”, 29). This is because Hobbes is describing the characteristics not of natural man, but of men who must continually seek power by selling his private property on the market. “In the fundamental matter of getting a living” Macpherson points out that “all individuals are essentially related to each other as possesors of marketable commodities, including their own powers. All must continually offer commodities (in the broadest sense) in the market, in competition with others” (55). When we consider the existence of a universal labour market as a defining characteristic of the possessive market economy, and we understand a man’s labour to be his private property, the competitive relations which Hobbes is referring to become perfectly clear. Since the market is universal, and there is no authoritative allocation of work or rewards for work, all men are in constant competition to meet only the most basic of needs, and to maintain even their current level of power. Hobbes’s theory of natural man was therefore based not on man in the state of nature, but on deductions made from the observation of men in necessarily social relations which are competitive. As Macpherson has pointed out, the conditions of the possessive market require a net transfer of some men’s powers to others, and continual competition among social men. As noted above, Hobbes’ natural man must be understood not as a man in the state of nature, but rather one who must consistently compete with other men in the possessive market, a social being involved in social relations. The possessive market society necessarily produces social relations which are more thoroughly and universally competitive than in any other society at any point in human history, so far as we may be aware. Macpherson has pointed out that the exchange of commodities “permeates the relations between individuals, for in this market all possessions, including men’s energies, are commodities” (55). The postulate that all men desire limitless power, as we have seen, is therefore tenable only in the possessive market society. It is only tenable about those “who are already in a universally competitive society” (45). Armed with this understanding, we can begin to examine the liberal state not only as an instrument of order, but one which creates and maintains a highly competitive society, and consequentially, also a type of disorder. The possessive market, in upholding the net transfer of power from the working class to the ownership class, also creates and perpetuates class antagonism. The alienation which occurs among the working class, alienation from their labour, and from the products of their labour, is a product of this fiercely competitive environment. Marx notes that “the modern labourer, instead of rising with the progress of industry, sinks deeper and deeper below the conditions of existence of his own class” (19). This is to say that the working class is involved in relations in which he sees his political and economic power appropriated by the owners of private industry. These oppressive power relations must be upheld by the state coercively. As Macpherson has demonstrated, the state exists “to maintain a set of relations between individuals and groups within the society which are power relations” (“Real”, 39). Marx goes so far as to say that the modern liberal state “is but a committee for managing the common affairs of the whole bourgeoisie” (“Communist”, 6). The relations which Macpherson and Marx credit the state with upholding are those concerned with the maintenance of private property and it’s accumulation through the market. In maintaining order to protect the capitalist market, the state also plays a major role in perpetuating a system of socio-economic inequality. As a consequence, the order which is imposed through liberal democracy, and other liberal forms of government, act to entrench various forms of class struggle in the society, and therefore to create, entrench, and deepen the antagonisms between various socio-economic and minority groups. In order to maintain, as has been put forth, a system of orderly net transfer, Hobbes and Locke both recognize the need for a coercive apparatus in government which will enforce contracts through the legal system. The liberal state exists, and is specifically well-suited for this function, insofar as it exists to protect and enforce property rights, and in so doing, to uphold the market, including the net transfer of power. This is because, as Hobbes notes in Leviathan, that if a contract is made in the state of nature, where there is no coercive power to enforce either party’s compliance, then the contract is void. There can be no means of assuring that either party will perform his part of the bargain. “But if there be a common power set over them both” with right and force sufficient to compel performance, it is not void” notes Hobbes. He goes on to point out that agreements by themselves, without the enforcement mechanism of government, “are too weak to bridle men’s ambition, avarice, anger, and other passions, without the fear of some coercive power” (91). Hobbes later notes that it is the coercive power of government which preserves property rights and therefore maintains the structure of the possessive market economy. He notes that where there is “no [property], there is no injustice; and where there is no coercive power erected, that is, where there is no commonwealth, there is no propriety; all men having right to all things: therefore where there is no commonwealth, there nothing is unjust” (96). Locke points out that a coercive power is needed “with an intention in every one the better to preserve himself his Liberty and Property” (353). The property rights which are necessary to the legal system of the liberal state, as Macpherson has pointed out, exist to protect the net transfer of power towards the ownership society. The liberal state, with or without the democratic franchise, must necessarily be dominated by the interests of the capitalist ruling class, and it’s decisions must generally conform to those interests, which are generally synonymous with those of big business. Robert Reich, Bill Clinton’s former labour secretary, points out that “business is in complete control of the machinery of government” (Borger, par. 18). John Dewey went so far as to conclude that “politics is the shadow cast on society by big business.” (Dewey, p. 440) It would appear then, that the state acts as a coercive mechanism which is more or less under the influence of the dominant interests in the market system, specifically guided in it’s decisions by the owners of the means of production. Owing entirely to the net transfer, the liberal state is a “double system of power” in the sense that the relations which it upholds “are themselves power relations” (“Real”, 42). The state must enforce the stability of relations which are oppressive to an entire class of people, and which, by their very nature, are antagonistic to the vast majority of it’s population. In so doing, the liberal state creates it’s own opposition in the working class, who will necessarily oppose the net transfer of power to the capitalist ruling class. In conclusion, insofar as the liberal state is vested with the goal of maintaining order in the possessive market society, it is also responsible for accompanying forms of social disorder, which are associated with the competitive nature of the market system. The net transfer and the fundamental competitiveness of the system serve to create and perpetuate internal forms of conflict, of which the most obvious, according to Marx, is that arising between the working class and the bourgeoisie. But class antagonism is merely a symptom of the competitive market made manifest. Hobbes’s natural man, who is imbued with the socially acquired characteristic of competition, is merely a reflection of the oppressive relations inherent in the capitalist system, a system of exploitation which is upheld by the liberal state. Bibliography Borger, Julian. “All the president's businessmen”, April 27, 2001. The Guardian. Guardian.co.uk. Manchester. 29 Jan, 2008. <http://www.guardian.co.uk/bush/story/0,,479212,00.html> Hobbes, Thomas. Leviathan. Ed. J. C. A. Gaskin. Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1996. Locke, John. Two Treatises of Government. Ed. Peter Laslett. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2005. MacPherson, C. B. The Real World of Democracy. Toronto: CBC, 1965. Marx, Karl. The Communist Manifesto. London: Penguin Books Ltd., 2004. ---. The Political theory of Possessive Individualism. Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1962. Westbrook, Robert B. John Dewey and American Democracy. Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 1993. Canadian MulticulturalismCanada is known as one of the most multicultural nations in the world, and to adegree, this is quite true. The effect of multiculturalism on Canada’s broader political structure has been markedly different than in many industrialized na- tions. This is largely because multiculturalism is deeply entrenched in the political system through policy, and holds a significant place in Canadian political dialogue. There are numerous reasons why Canada must embrace multi- culturalism. Among these are Canada’s diverse ethnic makeup, owing to centuries of international migration, as well as Quebec’s distinct cultural position within Canada. Multiculturalism thus exists as a policy response to a very real multi- cultural society. It is important to distinguish, however, that cultural diversity in Canada exists only in relation to a dominant Anglo-centric culture which has characterized the Canadian political and economic system since before confederation. Multiculturalism, in this context, appears through the lens of the dominant culture as an anomaly to an otherwise homogeneous system of values and norms According to this dominant ethos, multiculturalism exists at the expense of national unity because of an inherent conflict between the normative values of multiculturalism and those of western liberal democracies. This particular interpretation of multiculturalism is evident in the Canadian government’s multiculturalism policy, and is reflective of the inequalities which ethnic minorities face in Canada’s political and economic system. It is the intent of this paper to examine the perceived conflict between ethnic minority groups and the dominant national values in order to determine the relationship between the normative, western-oriented discourse and the experienced marginalization of minority cultures. In order to examine the relationship between multiculturalism and the dominant culture in Canada, it is important to understand the basis of multiculturalism pol- icy. Canada’s multiculturalism policy has hinged on a diversity in ethnic origins and cultural influences. Canada’s population consists of a diverse ethnic backgr- ound. The 2006 census revealed of Canada’s population of 31.2 million, six million people were foreign-born, and is seeing the highest ratio of immigrant influx “since the 1930s” (“One-fifth”). In addition to recent immigrants, Native Canadians make up a significant part of Canada’s ethnic diversity. In the 1986 census, the “Aboriginals” category had grown “to reach over 700, 000” (Krótki and Reid, 19). Canada’s unique composition of immigrants and ethnic groups means that the dominant political and cultural groups are constrained to respect the rights of several min- ority groups. The diversity of Canada’s ethnic groups is also reflected in the dem- ography of Canadians who speak a non-official language. Approximately two and a half million people speak a mother tongue other than English or French (Krótki and Reid, 29). The level of Canadian cultural diversity has proven to make assimilation into a dominant ‘Canadian’ culture difficult due to the sheer volume of dissenting voices. Chief among these dissenting voices, at least in terms of it’s population size, has been the French Canadian community in Canada. The unity of Canada has depended more or less, at various times, on the reco- gnition of the distinct French-Canadian culture which exists in Quebec. The majority of French-Canadians resided in Lower Canada, in what is now known as modern day Quebec, since before confederation. Lower Canada had been ceded to Great Britain at the time as a result of it’s defeat in the Seven Years’ War, and was therefore under the control of Britain as a colony. However, in 1774, the British Parliament passed the Quebec Act, which made numerous cultural concessions to French-Canadians living in Lower Canada, including the affirmation of the right to practice Catholicism, and the continued use of the French code civile as the basis of private law. The Act was passed largely out of fears borne out of the American Revolution. The British inten- tion was at least partially to “ensure the allegiance of the clerical and civil leaders” of Quebec’s population (Brooks, 384). Whatever the intention, the Quebec Act was an official recognition by the British crown of the distinct culture of French-Canadians living in Lower Canada. Later, the British North America Act would grant a level of regional autonomy through provincial government, while maintaining a centralized model of government. In doing so, the BNA Act “implied an official recognition of the political and cultural rights of the people of French origin” (Library of Parliament, 2). The political significance of French-Canadian culture was thus acknowledged by the Canadian government since confederation, with important implications for Canadian multiculturalism policy. The relationship between multiculturalism policy and the Quebec question became well-known with the establishment of the Royal Commission on Bilingualism and Bi- culturalism in 1962. The committee was established with the goal of examining “the issue of identity among Canadians” in response to inequalities among cultural and ethnic groups. The committee believed that by relieving French/English tensions, they could more effectively respond to pressures for cultural diversity within Canada. They would do this by conceiving of a “bilingual framework within which other ethnic groups could prosper” (Mahtani, 4). The committee’s recommendations led to the Official Languages Act of 1969 which would recognize French as Canada’s second language, as well as reform in the educational system which meant that both languages would be taught to students that showed interest. In addition, grants were made to various cultural groups to fund the preservation and enhancement of Canada’s cultural heritage. Many languages besides French and English were also now taught in schools when enough students showed an interest. The dialogue which has resulted from the diversity of Canadian culture, as well as the policy imperative of multiculturalism, has not developed without conflict. In fact, the conflict between minority cultures which represent Canada’s ethnic diversity and a dominant Anglophone culture has continued to define Canada as a distinctly multi-cultural society. This conflict takes many forms. Native Canadi- ans, historically one of Canada’s most disadvantaged cultural groups, have contr- ibuted a robust criticism of Canada’s dominant cultural regime. Native Canadians have regarded Western culturethrough a multifaceted perspective on what might be regarded as a “special relationship with their environment”. Georgina Tobac’s describes this relationship: “Every time the white people come to the North or come to our land and start tearing up land, I feel as if they are cutting our own flesh because that is the way we feel about our land. It is our flesh.” (Berger, 84). By noting the significance of the connection between Native culture and the land, one might see the connection between the perspective of normative Native cultural values Native and the broader environmental movement. The signi- ficance of Native culture thus takes on a perspective which is arguably counter- hegemonic, in that it demonstrates a significant conflict with entrenched notions of political economy. Criticisms leveled against the dominant liberal political economy present a strong argument against any notion of Canadian unity. Another major source of such criticism reveals itself in systemic discrimi- nation based on ethnicity, a major problem for individuals of ethnic minority background across Canada, by creating and perpetuating the myth of “racialized” individuals and groups. The problem is described accurately by M. Reza Nakhaie as systemic “inequities” which are “grounded in present and past racism and discrimination” (par. 7). A Marxist-structuralist analysis of these inequities reveals that they are the product of racial-ization, which results in societal class divisions. Vic Satzewich points out that racism “emerged as an ideology that justified the allocation of human beings to particular positions in class relations as the reserve army of labour, or as part of a cheap-labour fraction of the working class” (257). He goes on to point out, however, that racialization is not necessarily imposed from above, by a dominant bourgeoisie, but exists as a set of perceptions that “have their basis in real material conditions of existence”. He quotes Stuart Hall by pointing out that racism “represents the attempt to ideologically to construct the conditions, contradictions and prob- lems” between various classes and groups in society “in such a way that they can be dealt with and deflected in the same moment” (258). Regardless of where racism begins, it is clear that inequalities based on ethnicity and gender are increasingly a systemic problem. Wallace Clement notes that Canadian society, “as in many modern societies built on conquest and immigration” has interwoven ethnicity into a system of social stratif-ication so that it provides advantages “to the conquerors while keeping the conquered and newly-arrived at the bottom of the so called “opportunity structure” (163) Structural inequalities are apparent in examining the difference in levels of pay between immigrants and non-immigrants in Canada. One study, which included an analysis of the 2001 census “confirms that ethno-racial groups' income varies according to whether individuals are Canadian or foreign born, the immigration period, and the group involved” (Nakhaie, par. 6). The study pointed out that immigrants from non-European countries earned far less than those from English or French-speaking countries. In addition, ethno-racial minorities were acknowledged as generally achieving higher education levels, yet were “statistically less likely to appear in the upper income groups or to work in the types of occupations to which such educational credentials usually lead” (Nakhaie, par. 5). It is obvious that these inequalities exist as part of a broader systemic inequality which is based on the exploitation of ethnic minor- ities. It is clear that inequalities remain entrenched in Canadian society. The question that comes to mind, then, is to what extent multiculturalism policy supports multiculturalism. To answer this first question, we must ask another one. If Canada is a multicultural society, with strong political support for ethnic pluralism, why do these inequa-lities exist on the scale that they do? The quest- ion is a complex one, no doubt, but Nakhaie points out that the answer lies in the conflict generated by the competing ideologies of individualism and collectivism. As a liberal democracy, Canada embraces individualism. He points to the existence of “a powerful ideology embedded in every aspect of Canadian society [which] promotes free enterprise and individualism” as being the dominant ideology (par. 13). Anne Phillips notes that this ideology provides a normative basis for the definition of what forms of culture are acceptable within liberal multicultural societies. She quotes David Scott, who points out that “most [political scientists] are less interested in culture per se than in identifying a culture-concept that best suits their political theory of liberal democracy” (qtd. in 21). She also depicts the naturalization process as one of imposing liberal, individualistic values on the immigrant population. Phillips describes this process as carrying a degree of coerciveness which is used on immigrants “to make it clearer that they have opted for the values of their host society (usually assumed to be more liberal and democratic than those of the society they left)” (22). It is important to note, however, that the recognition of the collective disadvantage of minority groups was what led to pressure to create multiculturalism legislation. As Phillips points out, ““It was the recognition of unequal power relations between majority and minority groups, and the perception that states can unfairly disadvantage citizens from minority groups when they impose a unitary political and legal framework, that first gave impetus to the arguments for multiculturalism” (Phillips, 18). The question remains, as to what extent multiculturalism policy has served to address the goals of a multicultural society. It is clear that multiculturalism policy in Canada, to some extent, has served to obfuscate the original grievances of minority ethnic groups. From a policy perspective, Canadian multiculturalism has become less clear as a policy goal in light of a perceived conflict in the Charter of Rights and Freedoms, between the collective rights granted in section 27 and the guarantees of equality under the law guaranteed in section 15. These represent “two very different approaches to equality” ( Pask, 127). Section 15 guarantees that “every individual is equal before and under the law … without discrimination based on race, national or ethnic origin, colour, religion, sxw, age, or mental or physical disability” (Dewing and Leman, par. 23). Because of it’s focus on individual rights, section 15 is therefore more aligned with ideological liberalism. Section 27, however, states that the Charter “shall be interpreted in a manner consistent with the preservation and enhancement of the multicultural heritage of Canadians” and is therefore more consistent with the goals of multiculturalism policy (Dewing and Leman, par. 22). It should be noted that the values of individual equality which are espoused in section 15, and more broadly applied to the liberal political and economic structure of Canada, pose a challenge to the realization of the goals of a multicultural society in Canada. Nakhaie notes that multiculturalism policy tends to “clash with the idea that rewards should be allocated on the basis of individual efforts and tend to be rejected on that basis.” He goes on to note that liberal ideals “contrast the ideas of social justice, equality of outcome, and empowerment” (par. 14). This conflict also takes the form of what Lance W. Roberts and Rodney A. Clifton refer to as the conflict between “negative” and “positive freedoms”. As a liberal democracy, Canada is more concerned with providing negative freedoms, that is, the freedom from arbitrary discriminatory practices, than it is with enhancing positive freedoms, that is, the empowerment of ethnic groups “to pursue and express their interests”. This sort of policy framework thus works as a protection against structural change, ensuring that some needs of ethnic groups are met as long as they are “consistent with the existing institution-alized structures” (138). In other words, Canadian multiculturalism exists only to the extent that it does not interfere with the operation of a market-based society. It is clear that Canada continues to exist as a multicultural society, that is, as a society which is characterized by “adherence to a system or a theory which values having many cultures within a society” (Magsino and Singh, 80). And yet it is also true that the acceptable expression of cultural values must fall within the acceptable frame-work of liberal societies, a framework which is inherently oppressive to ethnic minority culture. While Canada is a multicultural society, therefore, the question remains as to what extent cultural expression is limited by the homogeniz- ing effect of liberal democracy. Bibliography Berger, Thomas R. “The Persistance of Native Values”. Ethnicity and Ethnic Relations in Canada. Ed. Jay E. Goldstein and Rita M. Bienvenue. Toronto: Butterworth & Co. Ltd., 1980. Clement, Wallace. “The Canadian Corporate Elite: Ethnicity and Inequality of Access”. Ethnicity and Ethnic Relations in Canada. Ed. Jay E. Goldstein and Rita M. Bienvenue. Toronto: Butterworth & Co. Ltd., 1980. Dewing, Michael and Marc Leman. “Canadian Multiculturalism”. 16 Mar, 2006 Political and Social Affairs Division, Library of Parliament. 17 Dec, 2007 <http://www.parl.gc.ca/information/library/PRBpubs/936-e.htm# acanadian> Magsino, Romulo, and A. Singh. “Toward a Multicultural Education in Newfoundland and Labrador”. Phase I Report for the Secretary of State Department. Ottawa, 1986. Krótki, Karol J. and Colin Reed. “Demography of Canadian Population by Ethnic Group”. Ethnicity and Culture in Canada: The Research Landscape. Ed. J. W. Berry and J. A. LaPonce, Toronto: University of Toronto Press, 1994. Nakhaie, M. Reza. “Contemporary Realities and Future Visions: Enhancing Multiculturalism in Canada”. Canadian Ethnic Studies. 2006. Vol. 38 Issue 1, p149-158, 10p. <http://web.ebscohost.com.libproxy.auc.ca /ehost/detail?vid=1&hid=112&sid=06fee*******8-497d-8a1e- b4f448e8352a%40sessionmgr106> Mahtani, Minelle. “Interrogating the Hyphen-Nation: Canadian Multicultural Policy and ‘Mixed Race’ Identities”. Mar. 2002, Social Identities. Vol. 8 Issue 1, p67-90, 24p; DOI: 10.1080/*******0*******26. 17 Dec, 2007. <http://web.ebscohost.com.libproxy.auc.ca/ehost/pdf?vid=1&hid=116&si d=ba17a980-ae5a-4dfd-8a11-5d3a39f4a733%40sessionmgr104> “One Fifth of Canadians Immigrants”. 5 Dec, 2007. BBC News. BBC News.uk. London. 17 Dec, 2007. <http://news.bbc.co.uk/1/hi/world/americas/7128 172.stm> Pask, E. Diane. “The Charter, Human Rights, and Multiculturalism in Common- Law Canada”. Ethnicity and Culture in Canada: The Research Landscape. Ed. J.W. Berry and J. A. LaPonce. Toronto: University of Toronto Press, 1994. Roberts, Lance W. and Rodney A. Clifton. “Multiculturalism in Canada: A Sociological Perspective”. Race and Ethnic Relations in Canada. Ed. Peter S. Li. Toronto: Oxford University Press, 1990. Saouab, Abdou. “Canadian Multiculturalism”. 14 April 1993. Research Branch, Library of Parliament. 19 p. Satzewich, Vic. “The Political Economy of Race and Ethnicity”. Race and Ethnic Relations in Canada. Ed. Peter S. Li. Toronto: Oxford University Press, 1990. Fetishistic Scopophilia in "The Bloody Chamber"I've decided to put a couple examples of my essays on the blog for the purpose of discussion and/or praise/criticism. I look forward to hearing what you all have to say.A socialist psychoanalytic analysis must explore the neurotic behaviour and thought processes within the individual, and conversely, analyze these processes in terms of the interplay between the fabric of social consciousness and the ideological superstructure of society. The linear social processes of modern capitalism, which are said to be based upon the relations of the mode of production, are symptoms of the neurotic objectification typical of fetishism. The consequent neurosis of the social organism is facilitated through hegemonic forms of western culture, and is therefore an inherent property in the interaction between the individual elements of western capitalist society. The characteristically obsessive behaviours and thought patterns which are typical of fetishism emerge as a response to the culturally normalized, often repetitive stimuli that have reinforced such idealizations. In psychoanalysis, the potential of the conscious ego to misinterpret the unconscious is what allows the fetish to exist and order our lives as it has. The effect is easily demonstrated through the repetition of a symbolic object in a cultural context. The relationship between the symbol and the context is often a social construct, either partially or absolutely. Through drastic reductionism, the subject’s response to a concept or image often takes the form of an obsessive compulsion in seeking to replace the original concept, as conceived by ego, with an artificially constructed “other”. The cultural processes which result from the intertwining of social consciousness with symbolic representation, that which Freud referred to as the uncanny, produces a sustained but distorted relationship between the ego and the id. These relations profoundly alter associations within the unconscious as the subject becomes socialized during childhood. The superego, in this sense, becomes a profoundly limiting force through the normalization of the uncanny. The resulting neurotic condition is the product of a newly constructed and limiting idealization, with the effect of obscuring a conscious perception of neurosis within individual behaviour and institutional structure. The relationship between the ego and the unconscious drives, which are reduced to the level of the uncanny, perpetuate a repressive idealization of sexuality within society. On an individual level, neurotic expression is reflected in the relationship between the subject and the fetish object, whose objectification is often the manifestation of a dysfunctional obsession. The nature of these relationships are explored in Angela Carter’s The Bloody Chamber. Carter demonstrates how the nature of the altered relationship becomes manifest in the obsession of fetishistic objectification. The effect of the uncanny on the unconscious mind is that it produces in the subject the illusion of a repressed fantasy. The fantasy which is created through this substitution of the real for the imagined is then projected on an objectified other. This process of fetishization reproduces, for the subject, elements “of the infantile anxiety from which the majority of human beings have never become quite free” (532). Freud muses that the “uncanny effect is often and easily produced when the distinction between imagination and reality is effaced, as when something that we have hitherto regarded as imaginary appears before us in reality, or when a symbol takes on the function of the thing it symbolizes” (528). The projection of manufactured fantasies is significant in the popular culture of western societies, particularly where popular media creates the image of a perfect “other” as the basis of an idealization of sexual expression. What has been produced by the perfection of the uncanny effect, in the age of modern technology, has been a system of propaganda whereby consent is manufactured, largely due to social atomization, which is an effect of the misplaced anxiety associated with sexual repression. This particular neurosis perpetuates itself throughout the framework of the entire human consciousness. The function of the symbolic in narrative cinema, for example, allows for “the projection of the repressed desire [of exhibitionism] onto the performer”. Mulvey also notes that the basis for looking at another person as an object “…can become fixated into a perversion, producing obsessive voyeurs and Peeping Toms whose only sexual satisfaction can come from watching, in an active controlling sense, an objectified other” (Mulvey, 1174). The presence of the uncanny in popular culture, however, did not begin in the age of mass production. It’s presence in more traditional forms has been encapsulated in the traditional fairy tales and popular story-telling of the past. Carter’s collection of short stories reveals the symptoms of neurosis inherent in the fetishization process, as represented primarily through the objectification of the female protagonist in The Bloody Chamber. The aristocrat whom the protagonist marries depends, for the fulfilment of his repressed fantasy, on the “otherness” of the narrator. From the beginning, the narrator is aware of her objectification, and declares “I saw him watching me in the gilded mirrors with the assessing eye of a connoisseur inspecting horseflesh, or even of a housewife in the market, inspecting cuts on the slab” (Carter, 11). This example of fetishistic scopophilia clearly “projects [male] fantasy onto the female figure” (Mulvey, 1175). At the point in which the female protagonist notices her future husband watching her, the passive scopophilia in which the male character is engaged also becomes an active, controlling gaze in which the protagonist becomes aware of her passive role in her fiancé’s fantasy. “In glancing away from him” says the narrator/protagonist, “I caught sight of myself in the mirror. And I saw myself, suddenly, as he saw me, my pale face, the way the muscles in my neck stuck out like thin wire. I saw how much that cruel necklace became me” (Carter, 11). At this moment of recognition, the narrator becomes aware that she is the central object of a language of phallocentric desire which transcends fetishistic scopophilia. She is now the object of a markedly voyeuristic investigation and subsequent demystification of the fetish object, a foreshadowing of the sadistic fantasy which the male character requires, through his repression and obsessive fetishism. As Mulvey points out, “voyeurism… has associations with sadism: pleasure lies in ascertaining guilt (immediately associated with castration), asserting control and subjugating the guilty person through punishment or forgiveness” (1177). The fantasy is carried to it’s unrestrained conclusion up to the point where she is about to be decapitated by her husband as punishment for entering the bloody chamber. While scopophilia and voyeurism remain two important aspects of the interplay between the subject and the fetish-object, the linearity of fetishism does not constrain it’s ultimate beginning and ending from the deviation of sado-masochistic interplay. The example which Zizek poses of courtly love as a manifestation of phallocentric control provides a stunning example of the ultimately illusory character of the fetishistic fantasy. Zizek asserts that “The idealization of the Lady, her elevation to a spiritual, ethereal Ideal, is … to be conceived of as a strictly secondary phenomenon: it is a narcissistic projection whose function is to render her traumatic dimension invisible” (1182). The subject, in seeming to overvalue the lady to the level of the transcendental signified, robs her of her humanity and subsequently devalues her. In further analysis, this process is functions principally as another dimension in the process of voyeuristic fetishization. This occurs in the sense that the usually male masochist presents to the dominatrix, or unattainable lady, the highly controlled illusion of false masochism, whereby the master allows himself to become humiliated under conditions which are explicitly within his own dominion. This complex interplay between subject and fetish-object in The Bloody Chamber appears most notably when he walks up behind her while she is playing piano and surprises her with a box of marrons glacés. Although after the first surprise she knows he is behind her, she is “forced to mimic surprise, so that he would not be disappointed” (8). The narcissistic character of the act of love becomes apparent, in this case, as it becomes reduced to the level of fetishistic enterprise. It is clear that the subject assumes a degree of control over the fetish object in his role as “puppet master” (39). The subject reveals the truly illusory nature of the fetish-object in reminding the protagonist that “Anticipation is the greater part of pleasure” (15). The control and demystification of the object’s abstract sexuality ultimately unmasks the illusion which has been constructed through sexual repression. Carter’s work exemplifies the extremity of a prevalent hegemonic representation of sexuality. The interpretation of sexual expressions in the work are based largely on the nature of fetishization which, when speaking in terms of linear expression, has implications which conceivably transcend sexuality in scope. It is clear that sexual repression perpetuates, to some degree, a neurosis which further limits the ability to transcend oppressive social constructs such as the commonly dogmatic interpretation of gender and sexual identity. What has truly prevented liberation from these highly archaic forms has been the continued presence of the uncanny as an ideal of sexual gratification which remains unattainable. Deluce 7 Bibliography Carter, Angela. The Bloody Chamber. Toronto: The Penguin Group Canada, Inc., 1993. Freud, Sigmund. “The ‘Uncanny’”, Trans. Under the supervision of Joan Riviere. The Critical Tradition: Classic Texts and Contemporary Trends. Ed. David H. Richter. Boston: Bedford/St. Martin’s, 2007. 514-532. Mulvey, Laura. “Visual Pleasure and Narrative Cinema”. The Critical Tradition: Classic Texts and Contemporary Trends. Ed. David H. Richter. Boston: Bedford/St. Martin’s, 2007. *******80. Zizek, Slavoj. “Courtly Love, or, Woman as Thing”. The Critical Tradition: Classic Texts and Contemporary Trends. Ed. David H. Richter. Boston: Bedford/St. Martin’s, 2007. *******97. Poetry to unknown woman.I wrote this poem for an woman who I will not name, she is beautiful. I had to write this for her becaue she was really down on herself about her looks, and her self esteem was low. Anyways here it is:Meg thought she was not the coolest But really her eyes told the full story. She was like Cleopatra, An element of nature. All of the world would bend to her will. She didn’t realize that she had this special gift Because she used it everyday And simply forgot it was there. And even though her smile would light up a room, And she was one of the best nature had to offer, I could never forget the time that she questioned her own divinity. I couldn’t help but laugh at the idea of it. Roses will be roses, and violets violets But Meg is as beautiful and changing as the blue sky. On such a plane she could rise above the earthly strife And create her own reality. Nice one eh! She felt better after that. AgnesAgnes Janet Orville had lots of love to give to the worldToo bad she was wrong about God’s home being above the clouds. She didn’t know what I figured aloud, The truth between her ears, she was sitting on a gold mine. I knew from the start that she was a smiler, too. And in my spare time I dabble in poetry sometimes. I am a poet. This one's called Agnes. The web of intrigue in this case, included the holy creator, He was everywhere, floating in white satin silk, she saw him floating on her children’s smiles, A stay-at home Mom with an amazing selection of products. She looked like she was trying really hard to hold it all together I love her look, like an ape, but only human, A sort of strange breed, and yet just like the rest. With her money, I saw her buying green vegetables like spinach. Grown in a vegetable garden. No pesticides. . Not with the conviction of a prophet, nor the message of one, But maybe that’s open to interpretation. She forgot that we are all a part of it, Have to look again, is it always the same? What if everything exists and all is true? Agnes is right. She is so wise This housewife from the desert plains, She knows more than we do. |